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In 1989, an iconic year for political and regulatory 
change across Europe, the European Network of 
Housing Research (ENHR) set in motion the pro-
cesses to establish a working group on housing 
finance. The aim was to bring together researchers 
in the field scattered across Europe working in 
universities, research centres, government depart-
ments and other institutions to monitor and analyse 
how housing finance markets were changing, the 
impact these changes were having on housing 
markets as well as on regulatory systems and 
the relationship between housing and broader 
finance markets. It was obvious even then that 
the future was going to be very different from the 
highly regulated or government funded systems 
that were the post-war experience with respect 
to both consumer and developer finance of most 
European countries. 
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The working group, coordinated by Bengt Turner - 
the Chair of the ENHR - and Christine Whitehead, 
was confirmed in 1990. Since then the group has 
worked together and met regularly at least on an 
annual basis, bringing in experts from a wider range 
of countries as research in the field has become 
more important. The group is now the longest es-
tablished ENHR working group with undoubtedly 
the broadest range of outputs including in particular 
regular comparative assessments of how markets 
and policy are developing. Now we are celebrat-
ing the group’s twenty-fifth anniversary – in two 
stages. This year, twenty five years after its incep-
tion, we held a workshop at the ENHR International 
Conference in Edinburgh at which we discussed 
early drafts of papers that clarify country specific 
milestones in the development of housing finance 
markets over the period. Next year we are publishing 
a book, edited by the current co-ordinators, Jens 
Lunde and Christine Whitehead, and published by 
Wiley Blackwell, which will cover experiences in 
twenty-one countries together with comparative 
analysis, bringing out trends and future prospects. 
The publication will be launched at the ENHR Inter-
national Conference held in Lisbon in late June 2015 
(details available at http://www.enhr2015.com). 
One of the particularly important activities of the 
working group has been our collaboration with the 
European Mortgage Federation - European Covered 
Bond Council (EMF-ECBC). The most important 
element of this collaboration has been a series of 
regular joint seminars (the last one held in Sep-
tember 2013). In part to celebrate this continu-
ing engagement, the EMF-ECBC has given us the 
opportunity to guest edit a special edition of its 
newsletter, Mortgage Info, to preview the book and 
to give its stakeholders a first taste of our findings. 
We decided to concentrate on milestones and trends 
that have emerged since the Global Financial Crisis 
in a cameo format. The authors of the twenty-one 
country chapters were asked, in 300 words or so, 
to provide cameos identifying the most important 
milestones and trends in housing finance mortgage 
markets since the crisis. The editors have then 
brought together some first thoughts on how experi-
ence has compared between countries and whether 
there are any clear general trends and lessons to 
be drawn. The intention is to give readers both an 
immediately interesting picture of developments 
and a foretaste of the much more detailed material 
which will be published next year.
The CounTries
The twenty-one countries included in the book 
and this special edition newsletter can be fairly 
readily categorised in traditional geographic and 
legal/institutional terms. The first eighteen are 
fully located within Europe. We have in addition 
included two, Russia and Turkey, which are partially 
European (and have systems that look to the West) 
and one, Australia, which is Anglo-Saxon in legal/
institutional terms but located on the other side of 
the globe. Secondly, within Europe there are five 
or six generally recognised groupings based on 
governance and economic approaches as well as 
geography into which our sample can be allocated. 
These include:  
   Anglo-Saxon – the most market oriented here 
represented by the UK, Ireland and outside Eu-
rope by Australia;
  Scandinavian – including Denmark, Finland, Ice-
land, Norway and Sweden linked geo-politically 
and in terms of their general approach to welfare;
  Central European corporatist systems – exempli-
fied here by Germany and Austria; 
  Ex-communist countries including the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia and Slovenia;
  Southern European countries – including here 
Portugal, Spain and Turkey; and
  A much less clearly defined contiguous group 
of Belgium, France and the Netherlands which 
individually have linkages to other groupings de-
pendant on the attributes of relevance for analy-
sis. For instance, the Netherlands will often be 
grouped with Scandinavia as indeed is France at 
least in housing terms (while all three are part 
of the original European Union as are Germany 
and Austria). 
As we look at the experience especially since 2008, 
it is obvious that this type of grouping hides many 
complexities and inter-linkages which reflect widely 
differing experiences both within and between each 
group. Equally, finance systems operate at differ-
ent levels so sometimes we need to understand at 




The authors are all specialists in the fields of hous-
ing policy and housing finance in their own coun-
tries. All are writing in an individual capacity. At 
one end of the spectrum there are those whose 
research concentrates on macro stability and private 
finance markets, with housing as a special case; 
at the other end, there are those who are expert 
in understanding the role of government and its 
funding in providing housing across the income 
spectrum. These interests often reflect the history 
of housing policy and finance in each country and 
inherently impact on what each has chosen as the 
most important factors affecting their country’s 
financing system now and in the future. The cameos 
presented here are short and sharp, reflecting both 
experience and culture. Taken together they present 
a complex picture of the very diverse experience 
since the mid-2000s. Using a consistent template 
the chapters in the book will cover both a much 
longer time span – beginning around 1989 – and 
a much greater analysis of the diverse drivers of 
change in each county’s housing finance system. 
housing finanCe sinCe The global  
finanCial Crisis
The cameos presented here suggest that, although 
finance markets are international and in some con-
texts global, the outcomes of the crisis at the na-
tional level have been very diverse. Pre-crisis, the 
upturns in housing and property markets as well 
as in housing debt were strong, long and moved in 
parallel in a surprisingly large number of countries. 
However, while the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
had immediate effects on all countries thereafter, 
both the intensity of its impact and medium-term 
trajectories varied greatly between countries. On 
the other hand government responses, while nation 
based, have been rather more consistent, reflect-
ing not only similar concerns about the effective-
ness of regulation but also the tensions around 
international competitiveness and broader based 
macro-economic objectives.
Here we bring together some of the evidence from 
the cameos to help identify whether there are gen-
eral patterns in the ways that external events impact 
on national finance and housing markets, and in 
how governments have responded to the housing 
finance crisis.  
diversiTy in The iMpaCT of The global 
finanCial Crisis
Again we can divide our sample of countries into a 
number of groups with respect to the impact of the 
financial crisis – but these groups differ consider-
ably from the categories identified above. Moreover 
the picture can be seen more as a multi-faceted 
spectrum rather than being made up of entirely 
separate categories.  
Experts in seven countries among the twenty one 
represented here suggest that housing finance and 
housing markets in their countries were relatively 
unaffected by the global financial crisis. These in-
clude in alphabetical order: Austria, Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, France, Germany, Norway and 
Sweden. The countries do not come, as many com-
mentators have argued, wholly from particular in-
stitutional frameworks but include examples from 
four of the six geo-political categories identified 
above. Some of these countries have quite open 
finance markets, e.g. Norway and Belgium, while 
others are still mainly dependent on special circuits 
of housing finance. The reasons given for the limited 
impact also differ greatly – ranging from relative 
macro-economic stability, as in Germany and the 
Czech Republic, a continuing limited role for private 
finance as in the Czech Republic, relatively strong 
regulatory frameworks as in Norway and Germany, 
and high levels of government involvement as in 
France and Austria.  
It is also important to note that in at least three 
of these countries there is considerable concern 
around current trajectories. In Sweden household 
debt continues to grow and prices have been ris-
ing rapidly in some parts of the country; in Austria 
major housing shortages are seen to be driving 
rapid growth in house prices and political pressures 
for change; in Germany there are similar issues 
although prices are rising from a low base and 
only in some cities.  
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Importantly, some of those who see little impact 
on the mortgage and housing markets also point 
to major problems with respect to the capitalisa-
tion and asset holdings of banks leading to major 
restructuring. These have had relatively short-term 
impacts on the flow of funds into mortgage markets 
but have had longer-term effects on housing supply. 
Germany is perhaps the most notable example in 
this context.
A second, overlapping, group of countries are seen 
by our experts as having suffered in the immedi-
ate aftermath of the crisis but then, with the help 
of specific government intervention to revive and 
stabilise the housing market, and to build stronger 
regulatory arrangements, were able to come out of 
the crisis relatively rapidly. Some of those we have 
identified as relatively unaffected would also place 
themselves in the category of having an effective 
government response – notably the Czech Republic, 
Norway and Germany. However, the group also 
includes Australia where there was a three pronged 
approach (stimulation of housing supply; support 
for financial flows and better targeted regulation); 
Finland which had learned a great deal from the 
early 1990s crisis; and Turkey where government 
moved to rebalance the drivers of housing demand 
and supply resulting in short-term setbacks but 
longer-term benefits.   
Thus experts in ten out of our twenty one countries 
suggest that either there was relatively limited im-
pact or that this impact was short-term and suc-
cessfully addressed by government responses. This 
is not to say that these markets have remained 
unchanged. In particular the crisis has been followed 
by recession in almost all European countries lead-
ing to considerable changes in market behaviour, 
particularly with respect to housing investment. 
Rather it is to say that these finance systems have 
proved relatively resilient into the medium-term.
Experts in the other eleven countries see the impact 
of the crisis as very significant, but again the group 
can be split into three main groups: (i) those that 
have returned to some sort of normality relatively 
quickly even if there are still underlying longer-term 
issues; (ii) those where there are major continuing 
problems but significant signs of improvement; and 
(iii) those where the housing crisis was central to 
wider economic crises which have yet to be fully 
resolved. Denmark, Finland (even though already 
included in the second group), Poland and Russia 
can be regarded as in the first of these categories. 
Market disruption was initially very considerable but 
market activity returned to reasonable levels in the 
following years. In most cases market demand has 
anyway fallen so there is no shortage of funding. In 
Finland the immediate crisis lasted only a year; in 
Denmark and Poland the adjustment took longer; 
in Russia activity levels had recovered with the 
help of government support by 2012. But issues 
of over-indebtedness and consumer risk appear 
to remain in Denmark and in Finland; the negative 
effects of foreign exchange mortgage lending in 
Poland, Hungary and Iceland that took place prior 
to the crisis will take years to unravel; and in Russia, 
while the housing finance market for mortgages 
and development are seen to have recovered to 
pre-crisis levels, there are growing concerns about 
the capacity to borrow on international markets. 
Countries where the effect of the crisis on housing 
finance and housing markets was very significant 
and where, while there has been improvement, 
financial markets are still seen to be constrained 
include the UK, which continues to see lending and 
output levels at little more than 50% of pre-crisis 
levels although there are signs of much stronger 
economic recovery than in much of the rest of Eu-
rope; Slovenia and Portugal where lending has con-
tinued to fall and signs of macro-economic recovery 
are still quite tenuous; and in the Netherlands where 
the nature of the problem has changed as a result 
of government measures  to mortgage tax relief and 
other housing subsidies, further delaying recovery. 
Hungary is also a special case because, unlike Po-
land, the mortgage market has been paralysed 
by the ‘unorthodox’ mortgage rescue programme 
and there are as yet no signs of either economic or 
finance market recovery. In identifying this group 
it is important to clarify that in all of these finance 
markets the credit crisis was very significant; there 
has been major restructuring of both banks and 
regulatory systems; and the levels of activity remain 
low by historic standards.  
The final group of three countries – Iceland, Ireland 
and Spain – are distinguished by the fact that the 
housing market and financial crisis morphed not only 
into a much broader based financial crisis but also 
into large scale disruptions in the real economies. 
Prior to the crisis housing output levels had been 
historically high and the cutbacks in investment as 
well as the near-collapse of their financial markets 
have led to international as well as national interven-
tion to support and restructure markets. In all cases 
there are some limited signs of improvement at the 
margin, but the extent of over-indebtedness and the 
loss of asset values mean it will take many more 
years before well operating finance and housing 
markets are likely to be observed. But it is also 
clear that this is only one end of a spectrum. Por-
tugal in particular has very similar attributes but 
had made adjustments earlier in the decade which 
enabled them to avoid a massive pre-crisis housing 
boom and many of the worst impacts on housing 
finance even though the real economy suffered 
extremely badly.
Thus the most important general finding is that none 
of the experts see current conditions as equating to 
longer run equilibrium. In a few countries, notably 
where mortgage markets are still relatively small 
and undeveloped so that mortgage finance plays 
a relatively small part in financing ownership such 
as the Czech Republic, Poland, Russia and Turkey, 
experts suggest that the operation of finance mar-
kets is continuing to improve with the expansion of 
wholesale markets and greater liquidity. 
At the other extreme in market oriented systems, 
especially in highly indebted countries, there is the 
hope, if not always the expectation, that deleverag-
ing will reduce risks to consumers, financial insti-
tutions and national economies alike. In almost all 
countries access to funding is expected to remain 
more difficult in the medium and indeed the longer-
term, in part because of changing risk attitudes 
among both consumers and institutions, and in part 
because of government and international finance 
market intervention. In some countries mortgage 
markets have of necessity become less central to 
the operation of the housing market at least in the 
medium-term. In the UK for instance some 40% 
of transactions are currently cash only. More gen-
erally, activity rates are unlikely to return to past 
levels both because of greater risk aversion among 
consumers and because of increased controls on 
lending. Most fundamentally the recession, which 
in most countries followed the financial crisis, is still 
affecting both demand and investment. Recovery 
is expected to be slow. 
ConsisTenCy in governMenT responses?
As soon as the scale of the crisis became obvious, 
the vast majority of countries included in our sample 
took immediate action with respect to housing finance 
market liquidity. These measures were usually part 
of a broader approach to keeping finance markets 
functioning. Many countries, including some where 
mortgage markets continued to operate quite well, 
found that parts of their banking system required 
restructuring and often recapitalisation. These prob-
lems required an immediate response, followed by 
more structured approaches involving ‘bad banks’, 
takeovers and transfers to government ownership. 
Initial interventions are being replaced in many 
countries by more coherent approaches to evalu-
ating risk and introducing more consistent and 
coherent regulatory requirements addressed at 
financial institutions in general and mortgage lend-
ing in particular. Examples here include Australia, 
Finland, Ireland, Iceland, Norway, Portugal and 
the UK. In the medium and longer-term the major-
ity of countries are working towards compliance 
with Basel III and the commensurate higher capital 
requirements. Consistent with these requirements 
many countries are looking to reduce loan to value 
and loan to income ratios – although from very 
different starting points. In the Netherlands loan to 
value maxima still remain above 100%, in Sweden 
a limit of 85% has been imposed while in Finland 
they are aiming at 90%. Many regulators are also 
looking to broaden affordability assessments which 
take better account of a household’s overall financial 
commitments. 
A particular issue in the run up to the crisis was the 
growing range of mortgage instruments available 
(including depending on the country, variable rate 
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mortgages, interest only, longer-term mortgages 
and many other variants which improved immediate 
affordability). In the main mortgage institutions have 
reverted to more mainstream instruments supported 
by tougher regulatory rules. Loans denominated in 
another currency, which were particularly important 
in some Eastern European countries as well as in 
Iceland, and more exotic examples have been with-
drawn by government decree or indeed by the mar-
ket. The Dutch government used the “tax weapon” 
to make interest only mortgages unattractive for 
first time buyers while in the UK the regulator now 
requires the credit assessment to be based on an 
annuity mortgage whatever the form of the actual 
mortgage. There are exceptions, notably Sweden, 
Denmark and Finland, where interest mortgages 
remain readily accessible, but generally the evi-
dence is towards greater restrictions.
Finally some countries have chosen, or been forced 
to choose, to make major policy changes with re-
spect to reducing subsidies to owner-occupation, 
notably in the Netherlands, Hungary and the  de-
volution of fiscal support to owner-occupation in 
Belgium. These and other policy changes impact 
directly on the operation of housing finance and 
housing markets in these countries.  
a ConCluding CoMMenT
In the following pages you will find the country 
cameos from which the overview set out above has 
been drawn. It should be remembered that housing 
finance systems do not stand still – this is very much 
an immediate viewpoint. Additionally the interpre-
tation of current evidence inherently depends on 
individual experience, both with respect to particular 
country cameos and the overview presented here. 
Other commentators would interpret the evidence 
in different ways and that interpretation will change 
as further evidence comes forward. 
Perhaps the most important message to be drawn 
from the material presented here is that while fi-
nance markets are in many ways global, housing 
markets and housing finance systems are very spe-
cific to each country, reflecting different histories, 
legal systems, institutions, economic conditions, 
policies and politics. The result is that outcomes in 
terms of both housing finance and housing markets 
are extraordinarily diverse.  
Even so, we can identify some consistent trends 
and impacts. In particular highly deregulated mar-
kets are out of favour and the implementation of 
Basel III capital requirements will limit the revival 
of mortgage markets in many mature systems. The 
trend is towards the introduction of both tighter and 
more consistent risk assessment rules, carrying 
with it the potential for excluding many customers 
who could reasonably afford to borrow over the 
longer-term. There are also emerging concerns, 
especially in countries that suffered little as a result 
of the financial crisis, around increased indebt-
edness (e.g. with respect to interest only loans 
in Denmark, Sweden and Finland) and increasing 
house prices. There are still many consumers facing 
financial difficulties, notably those holding foreign 
exchange denominated mortgages and those in 
negative equity as well as those in arrears who are 
being maintained in their homes through short-term 
forbearance policies. In many countries there are 
concerns about what happens when interest rates 
start to rise. The clearest message therefore is that 
there is a long way to go before we can claim that 
across the board European mortgage markets have 
both adjusted to the post-crisis realities and built 
up resilience to future shocks.
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Country Cameos 
 Please note that the opinions expressed in these cameos are solely those of the authors acting in their 
private capacities and are not necessarily shared by their employers or by the EMF-ECBC and its members.
AuSTrAliA
  By Maria Belen Yanotti, PhD Candidate, 
Tasmanian School of Economics and Finance, 
University of Tasmania & Judith Yates, School 
of Economics, University of Sydney
Australia’s financial system proved resilient dur-
ing and after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Its 
regulatory framework, the underdevelopment 
of the securitisation market, the predominance 
of mortgage debt on-balance-sheet, and con-
servative lending practice relative to other 
countries have resulted in a sound mortgage 
market. Proactive monetary and fiscal policy 
responses together with a temporary guaran-
tee on deposits in Authorised Deposit-taking 
Institutions (introduced in 2008) contributed to 
avoiding a recession. A permanent government 
guarantee (up to a cap) has since been put in 
place in 2012. 
However, Australia’s housing finance challenges 
revolve around generating accessible finance 
to income and wealth constrained home own-
ers and residential investors, particularly for 
affordable housing for young first-time home 
buyers and community housing providers. The 
highly concentrated mortgage market around 
four major domestic banks still relies heavily 
on domestic deposits and wholesale debt. The 
growth in long-term savings in superannua-
tion funds, together with the recent issue of 
covered bonds, could provide alternatives for 
long-term sources of funds to mortgage debt; 
securities instruments need to be designed 
and risk-assessed. In addition, counter-cyclical 
housing finance innovations are expected to 
improve the financial system’s stability and 
sustainability. Australia’s Prudential Regulatory 
Authority (APRA) is in the process of adopting 
Basel III recommendations. However, contin-
ued consideration with regard to the expansion 
of controls and regulation of non-Authorised 
Deposit-Taking Institutions in Australia is neces-
sary. Australia will need to asses which financial 
institutions are best placed and what instru-
ments should be employed to fund housing 
that is affordable into the future. 
AuSTriA
  By Alexis Mundt, research associate at the IIBW Institute for Real Estate, Construction and Housing, 
Vienna & Elisabeth Springler, Director of Studies “European Economy and Business Management”, 
University of Applied Sciences BFI, Vienna
In Austria, contrary to many other OECD countries, there was no drastic price boom before or price cor-
rection in the light of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Strong institutional interrelations helped to ensure 
comparatively smooth housing price increases and low housing costs throughout most of the last 25 
years. The high share of social rental housing has also contributed to this subdued price development. 
Since 2008, prices have not fallen but rather risen more strongly, especially in the apartment sector, 
in Vienna and in most regional capitals. Demand is high because of population increase, household 
formation and investment by private households: in the light of the GFC households have been relocating 
their savings into the purchase of real estate, which is considered a very safe asset. In the absence of 
price corrections in the aftermath of the GFC, Austrian households were not confronted with surging 
debt and negative equity.
Since 2010, the share of mortgage debt to GDP in Austria has stagnated at around 28%, which is 
low compared to many other western European economies. In this context, the high rental share in 
Austria and the dependence on own equity for single-family housing construction (or purchase) has 
contributed to the relative resilience of housing finance to external shocks. 
As for single-family housing construction and purchase, private bank mortgage loans have gained 
importance over the last decades, but in a moderate way as compared to international experience. 
The current widespread availability of low-interest mortgages has reduced the relative advantage of 
subsidised finance instruments, such as Contract Savings loans and regional housing loans. At the 
same time, since 2008 the regions have continued to reduce their overall regional housing subsidies 
which have played a major role in financing housing projects in the past. 
Even though the availability of new foreign currency mortgage (FCM) – mainly denominated in Swiss 
francs – to households has been heavily restricted since the GFC, hidden risks continue in the form of 
outstanding mortgages and will only show in the future. This is because they were granted as bullet 
loans heavily drawing on repayment vehicles that have shown poor performance. Since it will take 
at least until 2018 for the bulk of outstanding FCM to amortize, the eventual performance of these 
repayment vehicles is still uncertain and so is the vulnerability of households.
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BElGiuM
  By Sien Winters, Research Manager Housing, 
HIVA Research Institute for Work and Society, 
Ku Leuven; Coordinator, Policy Research 
Centre Housing
The Belgian mortgage market has expanded 
considerably during the last decades, espe-
cially since 2005. This has been the result of a 
combination of increasing prices for dwellings 
and land, an increase in the number of new 
mortgage loans and in the average terms of the 
loan contracts. In particular the amount of new 
mortgage credit for transactions and for renova-
tions has increased rapidly. New transactions 
were driven by the continuing increase of house 
prices and stimulated by tax measures, such 
as the portability of transfer tax in Flanders. 
Renovations were strongly stimulated by gov-
ernment measures promoting energy-saving 
investments, especially between 2009 and 
2011. However, compared to other European 
countries, the level of indebtedness in Belgium 
remains low: the outstanding mortgage debt 
was still less than half of GDP in 2012.
In contrast to many other European coun-
tries, the fall in house prices during and after 
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) was modest 
and prices started increasing again in 2010. 
Reasons for this limited reaction to the crisis 
can be found in prudent mortgage behaviour 
(safeguarded by the mortgage law of 1993), 
the typical nature of homeownership and 
building industry in Belgium (house building 
is traditionally mainly self-promoted) and the 
strong social security system. The introduction 
of the ‘woonbonus’ in 2005, a large tax benefit 
for owner-occupation, importantly sustained 
the market. 
Future development in prices will first depend 
on income and interest rates as housing mar-
ket fundamentals. In addition, some prudential 
measures introduced by the National Bank to 
strengthen the banks’ resilience and reduce the 
risks should have a stabilising effect on prices at 
the same time as a dampening effect on mort-
gage credit. Of particular importance, however, 
will be a possible change in tax regime by which, 
from 2015 onwards, the regions will be able 
to design their own tax policy with respect to 
owner-occupied housing. Although the system 
of fiscal benefits for owner-occupation is still 
strongly supported by the general public and 
politicians (although less by academics), for 
budgetary reasons cutbacks might be inevitable 
and during the next years could have an impact 
on house prices and consequently on transac-
tions, renovations and new building.
CzECh rEpuBliC
  By Martin Lux, Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic & Petr Sunega, 
Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic
The development of the housing finance sector in the Czech Republic after 2008 was affected by 
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Prior to the crisis, there was a boom in residential property prices 
and in the numbers and volumes of housing loans (mortgage and Bausparkasse) in the period 
2000-2007. Thereafter the housing market declined. 
As in most other post-socialist states, the impact of GFC became pronounced later than in devel-
oped EU states – in the autumn of 2008. While the number of newly granted mortgage loans had 
decreased by 19% already in 2008, the decline in prices and volumes of newly granted loans did 
not emerge until 2009. Between the third quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of 2012, prices of 
flats (apartments) decreased by 20% in nominal terms, but the prices of detached homes dropped 
by only 3.7% and prices of plots appreciated during the same period. The number of newly granted 
mortgage loans decreased by 35% in 2009, but the market recovered and broke through the pre-
crisis level in 2013. The volume of newly granted mortgage loans dropped by 50% in 2009, but it 
almost reached the pre-crisis level in 2013.
Despite the decrease in residential property prices described above, the impact of the GFC on the 
overall macroeconomic situation was rather mild in the Czech Republic. The financial market was 
frozen during 2008/2009, and decreases in the discount rate by the Czech National Bank had only 
limited effect on interbank money market rates. Commercial banks tightened their loan conditions. 
In practice this meant that the loan financing of new housing development projects de facto stopped; 
and mortgage loans for households were tightened through adding a maximum loan-to-value ratio 
or imposing a minimum income requirement to all new loan requests. The “innovative” mortgage 
products of the boom period quickly disappeared from the market, although formally banks con-
tinued to offer these products to customers. The default rate for housing loans (Bausparkasse and 
mortgage) increased in 2009 and 2010 and then remained more or less stable in 2011 and 2012 (at 
about 3.4%). No Czech bank was taken over or went bankrupt between 2008 and 2013.
There are no dramatic institutional changes envisaged in the foreseeable future. Property prices 
started rising again in 2013, even though the growth was not then underpinned by economic fun-
damentals. It is now expected that there will be moderate but gradually accelerating price growth, 
conditioned by improvements in the macro-economy.
(Acknowledgements: the research on which this contribution is based was sponsored by the Czech 
Science Foundation with grant number P404/12/1446).
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FinlAnd
  By Tommi Laanti, Ministry of the 
Environment, Finland & Timo Tähtinen, 
Ministry of the Environment, Finland
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) hit Finland in 
the autumn of 2008. It led to increased interest 
rates and drops in house prices as demand 
for houses declined. The direct effects from 
the financial crisis were, however, temporary, 
lasting only until the following summer. Then 
interest rates were reduced to historically low 
levels and house prices continued their climb. 
The more fundamental change in the Finnish 
housing finance system came in the actions 
taken to avoid financial crises in the future, 
namely modifications to the rules concerning 
financial markets and financial institutions. In 
addition, the Financial Supervisory Authority 
has been active in guiding the banks. It issued 
guidelines in 2010 with regard to lending prac-
tises, according to which the banks should 
not in general use higher than 90% LTV’s and 
should make scenario calculations on debt 
servicing based on 6% interest rates. It also 
demanded the introduction of a binding LTV-
limit for mortgages which requires legislation. 
It is suggested that the limits would be set 
originally at 95% for first-time buyers and 
at 90% for existing owners (the banks could 
not give higher ratio mortgages, but other 
loans would be possible). There would be a 
committee, which could set lower limits dur-
ing housing market booms in order to lower 
the risks of the households and the banks. 
The system is set to come into force in 2015. 
As a result of the changes made so far and, to 
some extent, expected forthcoming changes 
as well, interest rate margins have increased 
from around 0.5 percentage points to around 
1.5 percentage points. The banks have also 
increased their reliance on covered bonds in 
funding for mortgages. 
Mainly as a result of the weak economy in 
the last few years, housing demand has been 
low and house prices have been quite stable. 
This situation is likely to continue. It is also 
likely that housing demand will continue to 
be concentrated in larger cities and their sur-
roundings, while declining housing demand 
and house prices are likely to be experienced 
elsewhere. There is already some evidence of 
this taking place.
dEnMArK
  By Jens Lunde, Associate Professor, Department of Finance, Copenhagen Business School
Even before the outbreak of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in September 2008, the Danish economy, 
housing market and banking system had already weakened, and the crisis helped generate an ongo-
ing recession. Now, while house prices have fallen, households’ nominal debt remains at the levels 
experienced at the end of 2008, although the total includes more mortgage debt and less in the form 
of bank loans than before the crisis. 
As Danish borrowers are highly indebted, a deleverage process has been ongoing: the debt/GDP ratio 
has been gradually reducing since 2009 as borrowers had to repay debt, i.e. to save more and reduce 
consumption. In 2013 real GDP was still 4.0% below 2007 levels.
The outbreak of the GFC threatened Danish mortgage bonds, but the mortgage market continued to 
function. The interest rate gap which had normally been around 0.1-0.2% for nearly identical short-
term state and mortgage bonds widened seriously in October 2008, and the mortgage bond market 
could have dried up had defensive measures not been used. Here the most important initiative was 
the central bank’s offer to mortgage banks of a refinancing scheme for their “own” bonds.
The Danish government and the central bank made several rescue operations to avoid financial distress, 
keep the bond markets functioning, and to restructure failed banks. In total 62 banks stepped more 
or less “voluntarily” out of the market. No mortgage banks were in that group.
The GFC disclosed a serious systemic risk as Danish mortgage banks offer 30 year ARM mortgages 
with a 30 year loan guarantee but with annual interest rate resetting, i.e. with 30 future interest rate 
settings over the following three decades. This involves a liquidity risk that the bonds, issued for refi-
nancing, cannot be sold or only sold at extremely high interest rates at the auctions. This risk is very 
small but, if realised, the consequences could be enormous. The mortgage banks have increased their 
auctions to four times a year and a legal change of rules with respect to 1 and 2 year ARM bonds has 
been made, but the systemic risk has not been fully removed.
To meet higher credit risks, the mortgage banks have increased fees and differentiated rates between 
the expected risk on the different loan types, and thus are charging most for adjustable rate and 
interest only mortgages. 
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FrAnCE
  By Bernard Vorms, President du Conseil National de la Transaction et de la Gestion Immobilière; Former 
President, SGFGAS (guarantee fund for social home ownership); Former Director, ANIL (Agence nationale 
pour l’information sur le lodgement) & Christian Tutin, Department of Economics, University of Paris
The facts that mortgagors were not severely affected by the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), that the 
rates of default and possession barely increased and that it has not induced a credit crunch (albeit 
there was a sharp drop in the number of property transactions and construction projects) have 
limited criticisms about the characteristics of the French credit system: namely its restrictiveness. 
Paradoxically, the French credit system has been reinforced by the crisis. Certainly, the outcome 
will be to defer the introduction in France of practices observed before the crisis in a number of 
countries, like equity withdrawal, or the relaxation of the rules regarding mortgage contracts and 
consumer protection.  
The Basel rules will have a restrictive effect on the supply side and the main challenge remains how 
to respond to the principal weakness of the current aid mechanism for first-time buyers – namely 
its inability to encourage building projects in the areas where demand is highest. 
In this context, public aids have been so poorly targeted that they have become increasingly unneces-
sary. During the last decade, more than 70% of new-build dwellings that benefited from a subsidised 
loan were built in areas where pressure on housing and land prices are lowest. Conversely, on the 
most expensive markets, where demand is highest and the labour market more dynamic, aid is 
available only to first-time buyers who are already able to provide a significant down payment - bear-
ing in mind that in most cases such “personal” contributions rely upon family support. As market 
pressure and property prices increase, family wealth becomes more important than income in 
determining demand. It is the main hurdle excluding new entrants from access to home ownership, 
especially young people, but the solution cannot come from relaxing the rules of credit availability.
GErMAnY
  By Stefan Kofner, Director TRAWOS Institute, Görlitz, Germany
On the surface, the German system of housing finance survived the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
relatively unscathed. As compared to many other countries, no sharp decline in the granting of 
mortgage loans was observed. The refinancing volume has maintained a stable trajectory.  
Yet, the financial crisis has hit the German banking system relatively hard. The infection was primarily 
carried through indirect exposure to the U.S. mortgage market. Particularly affected were some state 
banks (Landesbanken), but private mortgage lenders also suffered. The German government has 
introduced a series of actions necessary to rescue the financial system since 2008. In so doing it 
guaranteed all bank deposits as well as the functionality of the Pfandbrief market. The government 
also created a Special Fund for Financial Market Stabilisation (SoFFin) and bailed-out several banks 
considered necessary to the system. In addition, the government has taken measures to stabilise 
the economy and the labour market. All in all, appropriate action was taken to protect investors, 
homebuyers, mortgage lenders and other actors from infection. The fire was effectively isolated.
Currently, warnings about a developing house price bubble are gaining ground in Germany. So far, 
however, the larger price increases are still limited to certain metropolitan areas. Also, developments 
to date are not reflected in significantly increasing volumes of mortgage lending. Nevertheless, given 
the low interest rate environment, there is a certain risk that a price bubble might occur if mortgage 
debt expands. Macro-prudential measures to limit mortgage lending may still be required in the future.
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hunGArY
  By József Hegedüs, Managing Director, Metropolitan Research Institute, Budapest & Eszter Somogyi, 
Researcher, Metropolitan Research Institute, Budapest
Hungary was hit hard by the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) partly because of the high FX mortgage 
portfolio and the weak fiscal policy of the pre-crisis period. Housing investment declined sharply, by 
80% (measured by the number of the newly built units); average house price decreased by 25-30%; 
and housing transactions went down by 40% between 2008 and 2013. The government introduced 
regulatory measures with respect to new mortgages (FX loans disappeared and bank/lending related 
consumer protection improved). Housing subsidies were cut for two years, and then re-introduced 
at a much lower level. 
As yet, there is practically no clear sign of economic recovery. The housing finance system has 
been paralysed by the prolonged “unorthodox” mortgage rescue programme started in 2010 and by 
unfavourable macroeconomic factors (very low economic growth; high government indebtedness; 
unemployment; outmigration of the young workforce, etc.). The government successfully kept down 
the budget deficit (less than 3%) and avoided austerity measures as a part of its populist policy, in 
order to maximise the political power by nationalising private pension funds and introducing punitive 
special taxes on banks and foreign owned enterprises.  
The “unorthodox” element of the “home protection” programme introduced by the government in 2011 
was across-the-board financial help to borrowers whose mortgages were foreign currency based. 
The so called early repayment programme helped well-off households who were able to repay their 
loans at a discounted exchange rate (lower than its pre-2008 rate). The cost of the programme was 
laid on the banks. 
The main social problem was caused by the households who were not able to make their loan repay-
ments. The stock of non-performing loans increased from 2.6% to 12.3% between 2008 and 2011, 
but because of the effect of the pre-payment scheme it went above 20% by 2013. The prolonged 
moratorium on foreclosures - which was introduced in 2010 and stopped in October 2011, then 
reintroduced again - created huge uncertainty and decreased the willingness to pay of low-income 
households. The new National Property Management Agency (set up in 2012) assists the poorest 
10-15% of households with loan repayment arrears exceeding 90 days by buying foreclosed loans 
and renting out the housing units to the previous owners. Meanwhile, based on a Curia (the Supreme 
Court) decision the banks are required to compensate borrowers for the increases in interest and 
exchange rates, a recent development which enhances uncertainty.   
Recovery in the housing and mortgage market is expected once the mortgage rescue programmes 
close. However, their costs to the banking and household sectors, and to the state budget, are still 
to be determined. 
iCElAnd
  By Lúðvík Elíasson, Senior Economist, 
Central Bank of Iceland – Financial Stability 
& Magnús Árni Skúlason, Managing Director, 
Reykjavík Economics
At the height of the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC) in the autumn of 2008, Iceland’s three 
large banks failed and their estates are still 
going through the winding-up process. Market 
transactions in the housing market came to a 
halt and housing investment stalled. 
Legislation on covered bonds was passed in the 
parliament in 2008. As a result, the new banks, 
founded around the domestic operations of the 
failed banks, have started to issue covered 
bonds to help finance their mortgage lending.
The Icelandic banks and pension funds are 
able to meet the demand for housing finance 
at market determined interest rates. A variety 
of mortgages are available at the banks with 
choices of fixed or floating interest, indexa-
tion, annuities or fixed instalments. This is in 
contrast to the almost universal model of fixed 
real-rate inflation linked 40 year annuities 
offered previously.
Nominal interest rates have been unusually 
low which explains the increased demand for 
non-indexed loans, but well over half of new 
mortgages are still inflation linked. Interest 
rates on non-indexed mortgages are usually 
either floating or, at the minimum, reset every 
three to five years.
Accumulated losses at the Housing Financing 
Fund (HFF), mostly arising from the increased 
risk they took on when its funding was 
revamped in 2004 together with shaky 
management of the ensuing prepayments, 
amounted to ISK 100 billion at the end of 2012 
(about 6% of GDP). Future losses have been 
estimated in the ISK 32 billion to ISK 170 billion 
range. A report contracted by the Ministry of 
Welfare in 2014 recommended the HFF be 
closed down and the structure of the mortgage 
market be adapted to be something closer to 
the traditional Danish model, leaving out many 
of the adjustments made in Denmark over 
the past 15 years, which have eased access 
to lending and lowered the payment burden 
resulting in over indebtedness.
How to address the excessive risk taking by 
banks, particularly when supplying mortgages, 
is under consideration at the Central Bank, 
which is looking at, for example, countercyclical 
measures to reduce housing market volatility. 
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irElAnd
  By Anna Coyne & Padraic Kenna, School of Law, National University of Ireland
Ireland’s period of unprecedented economic growth abruptly came to an end amid the fallout of the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The State guaranteed all banking debt in 2008. The State later agreed 
a financial package with the so called “Troika” as lenders of last resort - the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the European Union and the European Central Bank (ECB). The IMF arrangement for 
Ireland, approved in December 2010, was part of a financing package amounting to €85 billion. This 
was supported by the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism and European Financial Stability 
Facility, as well as by bilateral loans from Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
What is significant about Ireland is the level of mortgage debt to GDP which is slowing economic 
recovery. At the end of 2013, there were 764,567 mortgages on principal private dwellings in the 
Republic of Ireland, to a value of €107.4 billion. Some 136,564 were in arrears, with 96,474 in arrears 
over 90 days – 16.9% of all mortgages. In March 2013 the Central Bank set “performance targets” 
for the major mortgage lenders to resolve mortgage arrears cases. This follows the introduction of a 
significantly revised Code of Conduct on Mortgage Arrears, which sets down the process that lenders 
must follow when dealing with owner occupier borrowers in arrears / pre-arrears. In addition, new 
legislation to introduce a limited non-judicial debt settlement scheme was enacted in 2012, leading 
to the establishment of the Insolvency Service of Ireland. 
Legislation enacted in 2009 created a new category in Irish mortgage law of ‘housing loans’ and 
integrates consumer protection into these ‘housing loan’ mortgages. The courts have incorporated this 
legislation into mortgage case law and the subsequent regulation of the balance of power between 
individual borrowers and corporate lenders is creating a unique and innovative set of precedents 
in Europe. In any case, possessions and evictions have been low compared to other States with 
mortgage lending crises. The level of mortgage debt and the attempts of lenders and the government 
to balance this debt with the interests of indebted homeowners are the significant characteristics of 
Irish State housing finance policy since 2008.
Banks have been recovering from the economic downturn, previous lending policies and a reliance 
on global finance, and in the next two to three years the impact of the Banking Union will become 
apparent. This will affect the mortgage finance market especially with the introduction of the Basel 
III regulations and the EU Mortgage Credit Directive (2014), which aims to create an EU wide mort-
gage market with a high level of consumer protection. As a consequence it is anticipated that, as 
in many European countries, mortgage lending will become more restrictive, resulting in increasing 
reliance on the rental sector.
ThE nEThErlAndS
  By Marja Elsinga, Hugo Priemus, & Peter 
Boelhouwer, Delft University of Technology 
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and its after-
math led to substantial changes in the Dutch 
housing finance system, particularly through 
re-regulation of the mortgage market and revi-
sion of the mortgage interest deduction for 
income tax.
A new Code of Conduct for mortgage financ-
ing (GHF) came into force in August 2011 
(Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken, 2011). 
This new GHF included a range of measures 
to reduce lending and risks. The maximum 
loan-to-value ratio for mortgage loans was 
reduced from 110% to 106% then to 104% 
(and will decrease again to 100% in 2018 and 
maybe to 80% in the longer run). In addition, it 
became far more difficult for lenders to provide 
tailor-made solutions, which they had commonly 
done by means of ‘explain mortgages’ (loans 
that deviate from the 2006 Code of Conduct). 
Finally, for households without someone in per-
manent employment and for the self-employed, 
it became harder to get a mortgage.
In January 2013 the Dutch government intro-
duced the rule that mortgage interest tax 
relief is no longer available for interest-only 
mortgages for first-time buyers. So in practice 
only annuity or linear mortgages are deduct-
ible for income tax for new home buyers. For 
a medium priced house in the Netherlands, 
this will lead to an increase in the necessary 
mortgage payment of approximately 40,000 
euros, considered to be a substantial change. 
Moreover, existing mortgage borrowers are 
confronted with a rather minor change in policy: 
a reduction of 0.5% interest each year for the 
next 28 years for households in the highest 
tax bracket. As a result, after 28 years the tax 
deduction for higher-income groups will have 
fallen from 52% to 38%. 
There are three reasons for this strenuous 
intervention in the Dutch mortgage market: 
for some years the IMF and OECD have criticised 
the large Dutch mortgage debt; the GFC, with 
the threat to the country’s credit rating that 
might result from this level of debt; and the 
rules that have been imposed on banks as a 
result of Basel III, which means the banks are 
now required to increase the amount of their 
own financial reserves.
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nOrWAY
  By Rolf Barlindhaug, Researcher, NIBR, 
Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional 
Research
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) did not reveal 
significant inadequacies in financial market 
regulation in Norway. In certain key areas, 
Norwegian regulation was somewhat stricter 
than in many other countries and stricter than 
minimum requirements in the EU. This con-
tributed to the Norwegian financial institutions 
being relatively well capitalised at the outbreak 
of the crisis. 
The financial crisis led to increased concerns 
about the banks’ liquidity risk. The maturity of 
the Norwegian banks’ funding has increased 
and makes the banks more robust against 
short-term failure of the funding. Nevertheless, 
several Norwegian banks are some distance 
away from meeting the upcoming international 
liquidity requirements even after changes in 
the definition has made the requirement easier 
to reach. 
The Norwegian Financial Supervisory Authority 
introduced important mortgage lending restric-
tions on private banks in 2010, particularly a 
deposit requirement of 10%, later raised to 
15%. The intention was to curb strong housing 
demand and thus reduce house price infla-
tion. Another objective was to avoid negative 
equity for home buyers after a possible house 
price fall. First-time buyers were to a larger 
degree dependent on family support to find 
the deposit. Those without such possibilities 
have had to stay longer in the rented sector 
while they save the required funding.
The new Conservative government wants to 
soften the requirements of the Norwegian 
Financial Supervisory Authority. It has not 
formally changed the guidelines, but rather 
emphasised more flexible practices. Banks 
now use more discretion and are consider-
ing individual customers in terms of future 
wages, liquidity and solvency, and can give 
loans with LTV-rates above 85%, although not 
up to 100%. At the same time, the regulations 
around the use of the start-up loan have been 
tightened. Young households without equity 
can no longer apply to the municipality for a 
start-up loan with a LTV-rate up to 100%. Only 
those with permanent low incomes, but with 
the ability to repay the mortgage, can apply 
for a start-up loan in the future.
pOrTuGAl
  By Romana Xerez & Jaime R. S. Fonseca, 
School of Social and Political Sciences, 
Centre for Public Policies and Administration 
(ISCSP/CAPP), University of Lisbon
After the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), Portugal 
was affected by a rise in unemployment, a 
much higher tax burden, a decrease in house-
holds’ purchasing power, falling house prices 
and a higher-risk mortgage market. From 
2008 onwards there has been a decrease in 
mortgage loans and banks have placed more 
restrictions on lending, and imposed stricter 
requirements in terms of guarantees. Levels 
of mortgage default after 2008 were con-
tained and there was no evidence of serious 
problems with a housing bubble. This can be 
explained by the end of the housing boom 
and a decline in home construction following 
the end of subsidised credit in 2001. Other 
reasons included the small percentage of 
low-income households with access to the 
mortgage market in Portugal, high family 
equity, mortgage and personal (usually from 
parents), reasonable collateral on loans and 
the extension of maturities to 40 or 50 years, 
among the longest in Europe.
After the crisis, the Portuguese authorities 
became stricter with respect to the regula-
tion of credit institutions and bank customers. 
They also aimed to reduce levels of house-
hold debt with new legislation on monitoring 
public and private institutions, and included 
the Regularisation of Defaults (PERSI, 2012), 
a Default Risk Action Plan (PARI, 2012) and 
regulation to ensure Responsible Lending 
(2014-2016). PERSI laid down detailed rules 
on reporting information on debtors in very 
difficult economic circumstances who needed 
to renegotiate their mortgage contracts. PARI 
was created in 2012 to monitor the imple-
mentation of loan agreements, detect default 
risks and promote rapid default prevention 
measures. Despite these regulations, PARI has 
not been effective in preventing an increase 
in mortgage defaults over the last two years, 
which is expected to continue in the immediate 
future. On the other hand, housing prices are 
now rising and a significant pick-up in buyer 
interest in Portugal suggests signs of growth 
in the housing market.
pOlAnd
  By Jacek Łaszek, Warsaw School of 
Economics, National Bank of Poland & Marta 
Widłak, National Bank of Poland
The year 2008 saw a credit boom in Poland. 
Starting from 2009 the issuance of new 
loans began to slow down. House prices also 
declined until 2013. There was a strong down-
turn in the issuance of housing loans in 2009 
and the number of unsold new housing units 
grew rapidly. However, banks started to issue 
more new loans in the following years. The fact 
that there were still unsold housing units was 
not the result of lower availability of housing 
loans, but rather of changes in the housing 
government subsidy scheme. 
The most important event in the housing finance 
market was the introduction of regulations to 
decrease new housing loans in foreign cur-
rency (mainly denominated in Swiss francs), 
to limit loan-to-value ratios and reduce risks 
more generally. Foreign currency loans were 
restricted because their share in the loan port-
folio was very high (they amounted to 60% of 
the total housing loan portfolio in 2008) and 
also because some risks became visible both in 
Poland and surrounding countries. The financial 
supervisory authority restricted such loans by 
increasing regulation and by discussion with 
banks. Consequently, the share of these loans in 
total housing liabilities declined to below 50% in 
2013 and is still declining. Additionally, housing 
loan regulations now include such measures as 
loan-to-value restrictions which earlier were 
applied only to banks that issued covered bonds. 
Polish housing policy is based on homeowner-
ship and will further increase the housing loan 
portfolio. In the current system, where loans 
are issued by universal banks and financed 
by deposits, the central bank guarantees the 
liquidity of the whole system and the deposit 
portfolios are guaranteed by the government. 
The creation of a more diversified loan model, 
based on loan financing through covered bonds 
is in train. However, this method is more costly 
and so far not well accepted by the population. 
Moreover, legal barriers still remain despite 
the legal amendments made in 2013. 
We do not expect significant changes in the 
next few years. Banks are going to issue new 
loans, their loan portfolio might rise further, 
but their main financing will stem from retail 
deposits. The new regulations will make the 
loan portfolio safer and foreign denominated 
loans will further decline.
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SlOVEniA
  By Andreja Cirman, University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Economics, Ljubljana, Slovenia & Richard 
Sendi, Urban Planning Institute of the Republic of Slovenia, Ljubljana, Slovenia
Slovenia is one of the countries that have been most deeply affected by the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC). After a major slump in GDP in 2009, the country showed a weak recovery in 2010 but slipped 
into recession again in the second half of 2011. The financial crisis revealed many unsustainable 
business models within Slovenia’s banking sector as well as in the housing development and con-
struction sectors. A huge amount of housing stock, leveraged with an abundance of cheap funds 
before the crisis, was left unsold on the market leaving the banks struggling with massive amounts 
of non-performing loans. Practically, all the large construction companies were bankrupted and 
the banks have almost completely stopped financing housing construction. As a result, in the last 
three years new housing construction is at its lowest levels for 20 years.
Although the indebtedness of Slovenian households is well below the average in the Euro area, 
demand for housing loans started to decline in 2011, primarily because of decreases in household 
consumption and uncertain conditions on international markets. Declining household disposable 
income, lack of consumer confidence, high unemployment and a growing proportion of flexible 
forms of employment, together with the enforcement of stricter bank credit standards, led to a 
23% decline in housing loans in 2012 and a further 15% in 2013.
In 2014, the economic situation in Slovenia stabilised resulting in a more positive outlook for house-
hold consumption and consumer confidence in 2015. However, the effect of the bank crisis on the 
construction industry remains an important challenge for the future of the Slovenian housing and 
housing finance markets. The low level of new housing construction and continuing drastic falls in 
the number of starts may result in a substantially lower supply of housing in future years. A major 
concern is that this may put pressure on house prices in the following years.
ruSSiA
  By Andrey Tumanov, Evgenia Zhelezova 
Agency for Housing Mortgage Lending, 
Russia & Maria Plotnikova, Aberystwyth 
University, UK
Mortgage market development in Russia 
started in 1998, but the recession in inter-
national markets (2007-2009) led to liquidity 
shortages in housing finance in the second half 
of 2008. The government introduced measures 
to counter the effects of the financial crisis. 
State support measures included an addi-
tional contribution to the authorised capital 
of the Agency for Housing Mortgage Lending 
including 60 billion Rubles to refinance mort-
gage loans and reschedule mortgage loans 
for those borrowers who found themselves 
in trouble as a result of the crisis; and 250 
million Rubles to support household demand 
for newly built housing by providing facilities to 
banks to issue mortgages with interest rates 
at a maximum of 11%. 
Because of the state support for housing 
finance the mortgage market had fully recov-
ered by the end of 2012. Home-buyers became 
more confident about using mortgage funding 
with 26% of registered housing transactions 
in Q1 2014 purchased with a mortgage - the 
highest proportion since 2010.  
Growth in the mortgage market has become one 
of the main drivers of housing construction. The 
share of mortgage-financed purchases for new 
housing purchased at the construction stage 
has increased to 30-40%. Both mortgages 
and new housing output help to absorb the 
additional effective consumer demand reducing 
volatility in the housing market. 
Currently, macroeconomic instability and 
geopolitical tension are affecting the bank-
ing sector’s ability to borrow on international 
financial markets. This can have adverse 
effects on the mortgage interest rates and 
the capacity of banks to provide affordable 
financing for borrowers and developers. 
Current objectives specific to the finance 
market include further development of the 
secondary mortgage market in order to provide 
a sustainable source of long-term funding for 
mortgages and the development of special 
affordable mortgage products for specific 
categories of households.
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SWEdEn
  By Peter Englund, Stockholm School of Economics
Compared to many other countries the Swedish financial system was relatively little affected by the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC). After a blip in 2008-09, major trends continued seemingly unperturbed 
by the crisis. This is reflected in the fact that household indebtedness as a fraction of GDP has con-
tinued to grow (from 45% in the mid-1990s, to 75% in 2007, to 90% today, with the great majority 
of these loans being housing related) and a parallel trend of continuous increase in housing prices. 
The continued increase in lending has become a major policy concern, particularly in the last couple 
of years. It has caused the Riksbank to maintain an interest rate that has proved to be inconsistent 
with the inflation target as well as employment objectives
For a long time the increase in debt was accompanied by higher LTV ratios and longer amortization 
periods. This led the supervisor (Finansinspektionen) to impose an 85% maximum LTV limit on all new 
mortgage loans from 2010, resulting in a slight decline in the average LTV from 71% in 2010 to 69% 
in 2013. Currently, the supervisor is also looking to ban interest only loans. More direct measures to 
reduce the demand for loans, such as limiting tax deductibility of interest payments, remain lacking. 
Mortgage lending to households has traditionally been seen as low risk. Consequently, banks’ 
internal models based on historical data yield very low capital coverage according to the Basel rules 
– on average only 5% in 2012. This has been regarded as too low on macro-prudential grounds. 
Consequently, the supervisor imposed a 15% risk-weight floor for mortgage loans from 2013. 
Overall, the cost of mortgage borrowing has remained low, although the margin between the repo 
interest rate set by the Riksbank and the variable mortgage interest rate has increased from around 
100 basis points before the crisis to around 150 basis points today. This reflects higher funding 
costs for banks, combined with increased bank profit margins.
The continuing increase in house prices is a major policy concern. Combined with rents regulated 
below market-clearing levels, this has made housing inaccessible for ever larger groups of younger 
households. It is controversial whether the high prices can be explained by fundamentals or whether 
they involve some elements of a bubble. It is even more of a puzzle why new construction has not 
increased more. The answer to that question, however, probably lies outside the area of finance.
SpAin
  By Irene Peña, Spanish Mortgage Association, 
Spain & Baralides Alberdi, Independent 
Consultant, Madrid
Housing finance in Spain over the last 25 years 
has been heavily based on mortgage lend-
ing, which at the end of 2008 stood at more 
than a 100% of GDP. The onset in 2007 of 
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) highlighted 
the imbalances generated over the previous 
10 years of sustained growth, especially the 
financial system’s exposure to the real estate 
and housing markets, and the high levels of 
indebtedness of the private sector. The over-
emphasis on real estate developments during 
this period contributed to the financial sector’s 
distress, creating difficulties for bank funding 
and constraining mortgage activity. 
Important measures were undertaken by regu-
lators to restore confidence in the system and 
the flows of credit. The first of these measures 
was the creation in 2009 of the FORB (Fund 
for Orderly Bank Restructuring) to manage 
credit institutions’ restructuring and resolu-
tion processes. One of the main actions of 
the FORB was to manage consolidation in the 
savings bank sector, which was especially hit 
by the crisis.
The second set of actions was framed in 
the rules established by the Memorandum 
of Understanding (2012) to provide financial 
assistance for the recapitalisation of financial 
institutions. One of the most important meas-
ures was the segregation of troubled assets, 
through the creation of the SAREB Asset 
Management Company. The transfer of assets 
to the SAREB, together with the recapitalisa-
tion efforts made by the financial institutions 
diminished the importance of real estate assets 
and loans on banks’ balance sheets.
These important milestones, coupled with the 
deleveraging process in the private sector, the 
correction in housing prices and a more stable 
macroeconomic environment have contributed 
to a gradual recovery of the housing market 
in 2014. However, mortgage activity will be 
based on far greater prudence and responsibil-
ity. In particular, credit risk analysis will be an 
essential component in assessing mortgage 
applications. In this context the development 
of a robust rental market will be essential to 
provide for that part of housing demand which 
probably will not gain access to mortgage 
lending and to avoid the instabilities generated 
during the boom years.
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  By Yener Coşkun, Senior Expert, Capital Markets Board of Turkey; Visiting 
Lecturer at Izmir University of Economics & University of Sarajevo
The Turkish economy was transformed from a closed economy to a 
market economy after 1980. Market reforms based on liberal policies, 
were introduced and expanded both housing and finance markets. In 
the last decade, Turkey has experienced increasing marketisation and 
internationalisation in real estate markets. The Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC) had only a short-term effect.
Economic and political stability together with these limited negative 
impacts from the GFC have supported continuing growth in the housing 
market. Overall, the housing market has been in a boom period since 
2003. Mortgage loans increased to 51.6 billion USD in 2013 from 0.4 
billion USD in 2003. House prices have also increased significantly - by 
44.7% between 2006/7 and 2014/6. 
While current conditions appear benign, there are also observable con-
cerns on housing market. First, the mortgage debt to GDP ratio remains 
very low at roughly 6% in mid-2013. However, there has been no publicly 
issued mortgage backed securities (MBS) since the mid-1990s and retail 
funding remains limited. This lack of development in the primary/second-
ary mortgage market picture implies that further expansion in mortgage 
finance could be problematic. 
Secondly, the volume of construction loans reached 36.7 billion USD 
(78.8 billion Turkish Lira) in March 2014, with only 4% of non-performing 
loans. However, 32% of this loan portfolio is short-term. It means that the 
construction sector could be vulnerable to changes in funding availability 
and adverse market conditions. This risk also has potential negative 
impacts on housing markets. 
More generally the outlook for the housing market into the long-term is 
positive. However, some commentators argue that there could be excess 
housing supply if macro and financial market conditions change, while 
others suggest that there is a risk of a housing bubble. The immediate 
future of the market is currently one of the most widely debated topics, 
although data constraints limit the discussion.
All in all, the Turkish housing market has strong fundamentals and pro-
vides good opportunities for all stakeholders. But, it is equally important 
to note that housing (and real estate) market activities in Turkey may 
require more careful management in the next few years.
uniTEd KinGdOM
  By Christine Whitehead, Kath Scanlon, LSE London, London School 
of Economics
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) started early in the UK with the bank-
ruptcy of Northern Rock. By late 2008, the impact of the crisis went 
very deep, undermining the financial viability of many major banks and 
stopping the mortgage market in its tracks. The main issues related to 
subprime and self-certified lending but mainstream lenders were also 
granting high loan-to-income ratios and extensive re-mortgaging using 
interest only and other innovative instruments to increase affordability. 
Immediately after the crisis there was very little mortgage funding avail-
able. The mortgage backed securities market closed and banks had very 
little capacity to do more than provide replacement mortgages for the 
large numbers of mortgagors who had short-term arrangements. However, 
demand was also low as potential purchasers became more risk averse 
and the recession took hold. House prices fell in both nominal and real 
terms until 2010 when the market started to improve. Now prices are 
above their 2007 highs in nominal terms except in the north of England 
and Northern Ireland. However, gross advances are still less than half of 
the 2007 figure and 40% of purchasers are cash buyers. Housing con-
struction fell off a cliff - output levels fell by more than 50% and, although 
there has been some improvement, still remain at historically low levels.
In 2010 the Financial Services Authority Mortgage Market Review set out 
a programme of re-regulation based on more detailed and broader based 
risk regulation, which is now being introduced. Potential mortgagors must 
show the capacity to pay based on higher interest rates and a traditional 
repayment mortgage. At the present time this will have little effect as 
banks have anyway lowered loan-to-value ratios, except where there is 
government support while consumers are far more risk averse.
Initially government support emphasised helping mortgagors who were 
unable to pay their mortgages. However, falling interest rates meant that 
this was far less of a problem than expected. The problem was simple 
lack of funds. This was finally addressed in 2012 by the Bank of England’s 
Funding for Lending scheme, at below market rates to banks to on-lend to 
small and medium sized businesses and mortgagors for up to four years.
Government has introduced a wide range of initiatives, including kick-
start finance for developers; Help to Buy equity finance; and mortgage 
guarantees at commercial rates. Even so, neither the housing nor the 
finance markets are anywhere back to normal.
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